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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill was a named 
defendant in the original proceeding brought by Gunda and Laurence 
Galloway on August 25, 1987. She filed a Notice of Intent to 
Redeem, from a sheriff's sale conducted on February 28, 1989, the 
parcel of real property which is the subject of this appeal ("the 
Galloway property"). 
Gloria Ruiz d/b/a CVF Land Investments was not a 
party to the original action, but rather the purchaser of the 
Galloway property at the February 28, 1989 sheriff's sale. This 
appeal concerns the amount due and payable to respondent CVF Land 
Investment from defendant/appellant Merrill incident to redemption 
of the Galloway property. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this appeal before the Utah Court 
of Appeals obtains pursuant to 78-2a-3(2) (j ), Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended), pursuant to order by the Utah Supreme Court dated 
October 31, 1989 in Supreme Court proceeding No. 890409; also 
pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill appeals from 
the trial court's order of September 15, 1989, which increased by 
some $13,405.20 the amount required to redeem from a sheriff's sale 
1 
conducted on February 28, a parcel of real property located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah ("the Galloway property"). Respondent 
Gloria Ruiz d/b/a CVF Land Investment was the successful bidder at 
the February 28, 1989 Sheriff's Sale, and urged the additional 
redemption amount before the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
• 1. Whether sufficient evidence was presented at the 
evidentiary hearing to support the lower court's finding that CVF 
Land Investment's expenditure of $12,905.00 for the grading, 
reconfiguring and raising of the Galloway property constituted 
"necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon 
the property" within the meaning of Rule 69(f)(3) URCP, thus 
justifying the addition thereof to the redemption amount. 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented 
at the evidentiary hearing before the trial court to sustain a 
finding that CVF Land Investment's expenditure of $12,905.00 for 
the grading, reconfiguring and raising of the Galloway property was 
a "reasonable sum" to expend for the "necessary maintenance, upkeep 
or repair of improvements upon the property" within the meaning of 
Rule 69(f)(3) URCP. 
3. Whether Rule 69(f)(3) URCP requires or permits 
the addition of pre-redemption development expenses to the 
redemption amount if the court finds only that the redemptor has 
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been "benefitted" by such pre-redemption expenditures; if so, 
whether there was sufficient evidence below the lower court to 
sustain a finding that defendant/appellant Marcia S. Merrill was 
"benefitted" by CVF Land Investments regrading and development of 
the Galloway property prior to redemption. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 69(f)(3) is determinative of the question 
of whether or not CVF Land Investment, as purchaser of the Galloway 
property at the February 28, 1989 sheriff's sale, could undertake 
pre-construction development of the Galloway property during the 
redemption period, and then add the cost thereof to the redemption 
amount. A copy of Rule 69(f)(3) is included in the Addendum as 
Attachment 1. 
2. Salt Lake City Ordinance No. 18.64.050 is 
determinative of the question whether or not CVF Land Investment 
was under any obligation to regrade, level and raise the Galloway 
property, incident to any City demolition order. A copy of 
Ordinance No. 18.64.050 is included in the Addendum as Attachment 
2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case, 
This appeal concerns the redemption of a parcel of 
real property sold to satisfy a judgment entered in favor of Gunda 
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and Laurence Galloway, and against defendant Rowland H. Merrill 
(owner of the Galloway property). Defendant Marcia S. Merrill 
(defendant Rowland H. Merrill's former wife) was named as a party 
defendant due to her subordinate interest in the Galloway property 
as a judgment creditor of Rowland Merrill. 
The sheriff's sale of the Galloway property occurred 
on February 28, 1989. The successful bidder at the sale was Gloria 
Ruiz d/b/a/ CVF Land Investment. Six months thereafter, Marcia S. 
Merrill sought to exercise her right of redemption under Rule 69(f) 
URCP, by filing a Notice of Intent to Redeem with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's office, and tendering the prescribed redemption 
amount. She was prevented, though, by CVF Land Investment's filing 
of an affidavit with the sheriff's office, claiming an additional 
$13,405.20 due and payable for the redemption of the property. By 
this appeal, defendant Merrill challenges whether the additional 
amount may be exacted as part of the redemption price, 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendant Merrill deposited the undisputed portion 
of the redemption amount with the court, and filed a petition 
pursuant to Rule 69(f), URCP, for a court order determining the 
proper redemption amount for the Galloway property. Evidence 
relating to defendant Marcia Merrill's petition was heard on 
September, 13, 1989. 
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c. Disposition at District Court. 
Following the taking of evidence, on the lower court 
entered an order increasing the redemption amount by $13,405.20 
(together with interest on the additional amount), and ordering 
defendant Marcia Merrill, as redemptor, to pay the additional 
amount within the time prescribed by statute, on pain of forfeiture 
of her redemption rights. The court's ruling was reflected in a 
written order dated September 15, 1989. 
Defendant Merrill filed her notice of appeal within 
the seven-day redemption period prescribed by Rule 69(f)(3) URCP. 
She thereafter posted a letter of credit as security, and obtained 
an order of stay pending appeal. 
d. Statement of Facts. 
1. On December 9, 1988, judgment was entered in 
this action in favor of plaintiffs Gunda M. and Laurence Galloway, 
and against Rowland H. Merrill, Jr. (R.138-140). 
2. On February 28, 1989, plaintiffs Gunda M. and 
Laurence Galloway caused to be sold at sheriff's sale a parcel of 
real property belonging to Mr. Merrill, and located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 
19, 20 and 21, and 22, Block 2, 
CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION, 
according to the official plats 
thereof, recorded in the office of 
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the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
Commencing at the Southeast corner 
Of Lot 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. 
DESKYfS FOURTH ADDITION; thence 
South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet; 
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14 
feet; thence North 33 feet; thence 
East 150 feett to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
("the Galloway property"). A copy of the Order of Sheriff's Sale, 
(R. 143-144) is included in the addenda hereto as Attachment 3. 
3. Respondent CVF Land Investment was the 
successful bidder at the sale, bidding in the amount of $28,000.00 
(a copy of the Sheriff's Return of Sale, is included in the 
addenda hereto as Attachment 4). 
4. Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill held a 
subordinate lien in the Galloway property by reason of a Decree of 
Divorce entered against defendant Rowland H. Merrill, Jr. on July 
22, 1983. 
5. On August 25, 1989, defendant/appellant Merrill 
filed a Notice of Intent to Redeem with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office. A copy of the Notice of Intent to Redeem with 
filing certificate (R. 154-174), is included in the Addendum 
hereto as Attachment 5. 
6. Upon filing the Notice of Intent to Redeem, 
defendant Merrill was presented by the Sheriff with an affidavit 
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purporting to be executed by CVF Land Investment, claiming payment 
of general property taxes for 1988 in the amount of $500.04, and 
demolition, removal of trash and associated regrading of the 
property in the amount of $12,905.00. 
7. Defendant/Appellant Merrill thereupon 
petitioned the court for a determination of the proper redemption 
amount, and deposited the undisputed portion thereof with the 
court. A copy of the Petition for Redemption Amount (R. 206-211) 
is included in the Addendum as Attachment 6; a copy of the Notice 
of Deposit of Funds Into Court (R. 201-205) is included in the 
Addendum as Attachment 7. 
8. Hearing on defendant/appellant Merrill's 
petition took place on September 13, 1989 at 2:30 p.m. A copy of 
the transcript thereof (R. 269) is included in the Addendum as 
Attachment 8. At the commencement of hearing, the facts set out 
above were stipulated to by counsel (Tr. at pp. 2-3;). The court 
then heard evidence which established the following additional 
facts: 
(a) At the time CVF Land Investment purchased 
the property from the Sheriff's Sale on 
February 28, 1989, the property was 
occupied by a small, single level wood-
7 
sided house of not more than 800 square 
feet, (Tr. pp. 22-23); 
(b) The house did not have a basement, but 
only a crawl space between five and six 
feet in depth underneath (Tr. p. 23); 
(c) The entirety of the Galloway property, at 
the time of purchase, was roughly level, 
but was some 18 inches lower than the 
adjacent roadways (Tr. pp. 24-25, 27); 
(d) A few days following the sheriff's sale, 
CVF Land Investment received a document 
purporting to be a notice and order of 
demolition from Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Tr. pp. 6-7); 
(e) CVF Land Investment thereupon turned the 
notice and order over to Jay Hansen, an 
independent real estate broker, for 
compliance (Tr. pp. 7-8); 
(f) CVF Land Investment never made any 
investigation of what needed to be done 
to comply with an order of demolition 
issued by Salt Lake City Corporation with 
respect to the Galloway property, nor did 
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it attempt to assess the reasonableness 
of any actual or proposed charges in 
connection with any compliance therewith 
(Tr. pp.10-12); 
(g) Jay Hansen, following a successful appeal 
of certain city-imposed landscape 
requirements (Tr. p. 21 and Exhibit 4), 
retained the services of Cliff Johnson 
Excavating Company to demolish the house 
and outbuildings on the Galloway property 
(Tr. pp. 18-20); 
(h) In addition to demolishing the structures 
on the property, Cliff Johnson Excavating 
undertook to haul and spread 1,384 tons 
of fill material onto the Galloway 
property, for which he charged CVF Land 
Investment $7.00 per ton, for a total 
charge of $9,690.00 (Tr. at p. 38, and 
Exhibit 8); in addition to fill 
material, Cliff Johnson Excavating 
charged CVF Land Investment $3,210.00 for 
the actual demolition project, bringing 
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the total bill to $12,900-00 (Tr. pp. 8-
9, Exhibit 2). 
9. The court then received expert testimony from 
John Henry McCaughey, general manager and vice president of 
Northern Nevada Construction Company, regarding the requirements 
for full compliance with Salt Lake City Demolition Orders and the 
reasonable cost thereof. Mr. McCaughey testified as follows: 
(a) He had examined the Galloway property, 
together with a house on a lot adjacent 
to the Galloway property which was, in 
all respects, identical to the house 
which had stood on the Galloway property 
(Tr. at pp. 25-26, 30 and Exhibits 5, 6 
and 7); 
(b) In his estimate, a reasonable charge for 
the demolition of such a structure, 
including the filling in of the crawl 
space underneath to the level of the 
surrounding grade, could be accomplished 
for $1,500.00, and no more than $1,800.00 
(Tr. at pp. 30-31); 
(c) This estimate would be based upon the 
removal of the structures on the 
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property, together with the placement of 
some 60-70 yards of fill (or 90-105 
tons), which would be sufficient to bring 
the crawl space to the grade of 
surrounding property (Tr. pp. 31-31, 37); 
(d) Salt Lake City demolition requirements 
did not include the raising or changing 
of the level or grade of the entire lot 
on which the structure to be demolished 
is located (Tr. 32-33); 
(e) City requirements did not include tree 
removal as part of a demolition order, 
and in fact encouraged, where possible, 
that trees be left in place (Tr. p. 33). 
10. The court received no evidence whatever 
establishing any of the following: 
(a) That Salt Lake City had ordered, 
instructed or otherwise requested CVF 
Land Investment to bring in any more fill 
material than would have been necessary 
to bring any holes left by the demolition 
of existing structures to the level of 
the surrounding grade; 
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(b) That Salt Lake City had ordered CVF Land 
Investment to perform any act or 
procedure, in conjunction with the 
demolition of structures on the Galloway 
property, over and above what was 
required by Salt Lake City ordinance (in 
fact, quite the opposite—Salt Lake City 
apparently waived landscaping 
requirements in conjunction with the 
demolition order, at the request of Mr. 
Hansen—see Exhibit 4); 
(c) That conditions on the Galloway property 
were such that the raising or levelling 
of the grade thereon was a necessary 
prerequisite either to the maintenance or 
the development of the Gcilloway property 
for any identified purpose; 
(d) That $12,900.00 was in any way a 
"reasonable price" for the demolition of 
the structure of the sort which had 
occupied the Galloway property at the 
time of the February sheriff's sale, in 
accordance with applicable Salt Lake City 
12 
ordinances (as noted above, evidence in 
this regard was directly to the 
contrary); 
(e) That $7.00 per ton was a "reasonable 
price" for the fill material delivered to 
the Galloway property (again, to the 
contrary, Mr. McCaughey established that 
the price of $7.00 per ton was clearly 
excessive, even assuming the necessity of 
placing it on the Galloway property to 
begin with—see ir 9(c) above); 
(f) That the raising and levelling of the 
entire Galloway property, as performed by 
Cliff Johnson Excavating Company, 
constituted, in any way, a procedure 
necessary to the maintenance, upkeep, or 
repair of improvements on the Galloway 
property; or 
(g) That sums paid to Cliff Johnson 
Excavating Company were in any way 
"reasonable" for the work performed. 
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11. Immediately following the presentation of 
evidence, and without permitting any closing argument from 
counsel, the court entered the following ruling: 
. . .and it is true it is probably 
not too prudent to spend any money 
on it until the redemption period is 
passed. You know, what to do with 
it. But the City tells her she has 
to demolish, whether she really 
reads the ordinance correctly or 
whether she doesn't, she puts the 
money into the property. And then 
the people come in and redeem it, 
and property has been improved, and 
they receive the benefits of the 
property, improvement or upkeep. 
Maybe not considerably a benefit. 
They might have wanted the house and 
trees and whatever, but 
nevertheless, what has gone into it. 
I really can't—you can't say 
that's even reasonable. That seem 
to be to be the question, not 
whether it is, you know, perfectly 
the right thing to do, but whether 
it was reasonable. And I think it 
was reasonable, and so I think I am 
going to rule that the redemption 
value here is the amount paid for 
the property plus six percent plus 
the taxes plus the 12,905 she paid 
for the excavation and 10 percent 
interest thereon. And that should 
be the amount that's required for 
the amount of redemption. 
12.1. On September 15, 1989, the court entered a 
written order adjusting the redemption to be paid for the Galloway 
property in accordance with its ruling on September 13, ($. 238-
14 
240). A copy of the Court's Order is included in the Addendum as 
Attachment 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
There was no evidence presented in the 
proceedings before the trial court to sustain the court's finding 
that CVF Land Investments1 improvements to the Galloway property 
during the redemption period (including the hauling and spreading 
of 1400 tons of prime-grade fill material for the purpose of 
regrading and levelling the entire parcel of land) constituted 
"necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon 
the property" within the meaning of Rule 69(f)(3), URCP. 
POINT II. 
There was no evidence presented to the trial court 
to sustain a finding that the expenditure of $12,900,00 by CVF 
Land Investment in conjunction with the demolition of the existing 
structures on the Galloway property, together with the raising and 
re-grading of the entire parcel of land, constituted a "reasonable 
sum for . . . necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any 
improvements upon the property" within the meaning of Rule 
69(f)(3), URCP. 
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POINT III. 
Rule 69(f)(3), URCP does not justify the addition 
of pre-redemption development expenditures to the required 
redemption amount simply upon a finding of "benefit" to the 
redemptors; rather, to be recoverable as part of the redemption 
amount, expenditures on the redeemed property must constitute a 
"reasonable sum" for "necessary maintenance, upkeep and repair of 
improvements to the property"--in other words, maintenance of the 
status quo between the date of sale and the end of the redemption 
period. 
In any event, no evidence was presented to the 
lower court to suggest that CVF Land Investments1 massive 
regrading and raising of the Galloway property in any way 
"benefitted" defendant/appellant Merrill as redemptor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 
GALLOWAY PROPERTY CONSTITUTED COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT, RATHER THAN "NECESSARY 
MAINTENANCE, UPKEEP AND REPAIR OF ' 
IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE PROPERTY" AND THE COST 
THEREOF MAY NOT BE ADDED TO THE 
REDEMPTION AMOUNT 
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides in part as follows: 
The property [sold at sheriff's 
sale] may be redeemed from the 
16 
purchaser within six months after 
the sale by paying the amount of his 
purchase with six percent added 
thereon in addition, together with 
the amount of any assessment or 
taxes, and any reasonable sum for 
fire insurance or necessary 
maintenance, upkeep or repair of 
improvements upon the property which 
the purchaser may have paid thereon 
after the purchase, with interest on 
such amounts. • . " (Emphasis 
added). 
The record of the trial court evidentiary proceeding on September 
13, 1989 plainly establishes that the trial court's implied 
finding1 that the post-sale improvements to the Galloway property 
constituted "necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of 
improvements" was not only against the substantial weight of the 
evidence, but was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. 
The evidence of record is completely uncontested. 
At the sheriff's sale, CVF Land Investment purchased approximately 
one acre of land, occupied by an 800-square foot, single story 
structure with a six-foot crawl space underneath, together with an 
xAt the conclusion of evidence, the trial court began by 
observing that the question to be determined included both the 
necessity and reasonableness of repairs performed by CVF Land 
Investment. The court's holding, however, focused exclusively on 
whether sums expended were reasonable--the question of necessity 
dropped out of the court's analysis entirely. Only in the court's 
final, written order (Attachment 9 hereto) was an express finding 
made that CVF Land Investment's expenditures on the Galloway 
property were necessary for maintenance, upkeep or repair of 
improvements thereon. 
17 
associated outbuilding. Absent the alleged demolition order from 
Salt Lake City Corporation, the only maintenance costs which CVF 
Land Investment would be entitled to add to the redemption figure 
would be those necessary for the reasonable upkeep of the house, 
outbuilding and grounds. 
CVF Land Investment claims, however, that it was 
required to demolish the house by an alleged order of Salt Lake 
City Corporation. The order in question was never authenticated; 
however, even assuming its authenticity, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that CVF Land Investments was required (or could have 
reasonably believed itself required) to do any more than demolish 
existing structures on the Galloway property, in conformance with 
applicable city ordinances. The relevant procedure is framed by 
18.65.059, Salt Lake City Ordinances: 
A permit for demolition requires 
that all materials comprising part 
of the existing structure(s), 
including the foundation and 
footings, must be removed from the 
site. The depression caused by the 
removal of such debris must be 
filled back and compacted to the 
original grade, as approved by the 
building official, with fill 
material excluding detrimental 
amounts of organic material or 
large-dimension non-organic 
material. (Emphasis added.) 
18 
In other words, CVF Land Investment would have been in full 
compliance with the applicable City ordinance by removing the 
house and outbuilding, and by filling in the six-foot crawl space 
to the surrounding grade, with fill material of sufficient quality 
to meet City standards. The evidence was unrebutted and unrefuted 
that this task could have been accomplished at a price of between 
$1,500 and $1,800.2 
Rather than simply filling in the depression caused 
by demolition of the home on the Galloway property and compacting 
it to the original grade, however, CVF Land Investment undertook 
a far more ambitious project. It began commercial development of 
the Galloway property by hauling in, grading and levelling 1,400 
tons of prime-grade, $7.00-per-ton fill material to raise the 
level of the entire lot to the level of Redwood Road, adjacent on 
the east (an average rise of some 18 inches overall). The purpose 
of the additional fill is self-evident—it was not brought in to 
maintain existing conditions, or to comply with any mandate under 
Salt Lake City ordinance, but to commence full-scale construction 
on the property preparatory to commercial development thereof. 
20n cross examination, defendant/appellant Merrill's 
demolition expert testified that, even including the removal of 
trees (which is nowhere required in the alleged demolition order, 
nor any applicable City ordinance), the price of the job could not 
exceed $2,500. 
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Having voluntarily expended commercial development funds, CVF Land 
Investment now expects defendant/appellant Merrill, as redemptor, 
to reimburse it dollar-for-dollar as part of the redemption price. 
The law has long been well settled that a purchaser 
or transferee of real property, who takes title subject to what he 
knows or should know to be a potentially superior claim thereto, 
cannot claim compensation for improvements thereon. See generally 
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, §18. In particular, the purchaser 
of a property at judicial sale may not claim, from an aspiring 
redemptor, compensation for improvements placed on the property 
with knowledge of existing redemption rights. In the case of 
Sedlak v. Duda, 144 Neb. 567, 13 N.W.2d 892 (1944), the Nebraska 
Supreme Court expressly held that the lower court had erred in 
awarding the cost of improvements, performed by a purchaser at a 
judicial sale, as part of the redemption price for the property: 
For the purpose of redemption, a 
purchaser in good faith at the 
judicial sale, believing that he has 
good title, will be entitled to 
credit for improvements made upon 
the property. But one who buys with 
notice of the facts is not a 
purchaser in good faith, within the 
meaning of the rule, and is not 
entitled to such credit. 
13 N.W. 2d at p. 897. 
20 
Rule 69(f)(3) was plainly framed with an eye to the 
foregoing rule of law. By its terms, the rule limits the 
purchaser of real property to the recovery of expenditures for 
maintenance, not for the cost of improvements. 
CVF Land Investment, like any other purchaser at a 
sheriff's sale conducted under Rule 69, took with full knowledge 
that the sale was subject to statutory rights of redemption. In 
its decision to move forward with development of the property 
during the redemption period, it had no legal right to assume that 
it would receive guaranteed reimbursement in the event the 
property was redeemed from sale. 
Rule 69(f)(3) is also framed to prohibit the 
deliberate subversion of assumption rights by costly pre-
redemption development. By limiting added redemption amounts to 
sums expended for "necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of 
improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase", Rule 69(f)(3) prevents a purchaser 
from making redemption prohibitively expensive by undertaking 
costly development of the property during the redemption period, 
and then demanding the price thereof as part of the redemption 
amount. Thus, for instance, CVF Land Investment would not be 
entitled to demand the full fair market value of a restaurant, 
warehouse, or office building on the Galloway property (had it 
21 
managed to finish construction thereof during the redemption 
period). By the same token, it is not entitled to recover sums 
expended, not in necessary maintenance or upkeep, but in 
preliminary grading and development for commercial purposes. 
An analogy may be drawn tc> Utah's Eminent Domain 
Code. Under 78-34-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the 
right to just compensation for land taken under the power of 
eminent domain is deemed to accrue as of the date of the service 
of summons, and the amount of compensation is fixed on that date. 
The purpose of this rule is to prevent a landowner from 
undertaking hasty and costly development of his property following 
the initiation of condemnation proceedings, for the purpose of 
enhancing its fair market value and increasing the compensation 
award. 
By the same token, Rule 69(f)(3) effectively 
"freezes" the property as of the date of purchase—the purchaser 
may recover, as a part of the redemption, only the necessary sums 
in maintaining the status quo during the redemption period; there 
is no entitlement to inflate the redemption amount through 
premature development of the property prior to the expiration of 
the redemption period. The law does not prohibit the purchaser of 
property at a sheriff's sale from undertaking immediate 
development of the property; neither, however, does it guarantee 
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the purchaser dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of development sums 
expended in the event of redemption. Indeed, the trial court 
itself acknowledged that "it is probably not too prudent to spend 
any money on [property purchased at a sheriff's sale] until the 
redemption period is past" (Transcript at p. 41). Were 
development expenditures properly recoverable as part of the 
redemption amount, pre-redemption development would not be 
imprudent--it would be a shrewd business ploy to block redemption. 
CVF Land Investment's position in all of this, of 
course, is that it was not actually undertaking commercial 
development of the Galloway property at all, but merely complying 
with what it understood to be a City requirement incident to the 
alleged demolition order. Mr. Hansen repeatedly attempted to 
introduce hearsay testimony to buttress this understanding; the 
Court, however, excluded all such testimony. What we are left 
with, therefore, is an unexplained "understanding" that City 
ordinances required the depositing of 1,400 tons of fill on the 
Galloway property in order to comply with a supposed demolition 
order covering 1 880-square-foot house. That such extensive 
regrading procedures are not actually required by city-mandated 
demolition procedures is established by the ordinance quoted at 
page 19, above; CVF Land Investment cannot render the procedures 
"necessary" by giving voice to a groundless, self-serving, 
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"understanding" which is wholly unreasonable under the 
circumstances. 
The evidence is clear and uncontested that sums 
expended by CVF Land Investment for the development of the 
Galloway property were not necessary for the maintenance of 
improvements on the Galloway property, and may not be awarded as 
part of a redemption amount. 
POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING THE NECESSITY OF CVF 
LAND INVESTMENTS PRE-REDEMPTION 
EXPENDITURES ON THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY, 
THE AMOUNT THEREOF WAS NOT REASONABLE 
Rule 69(f)(3) URCP, does not permit the wholesale 
addition, to the statutory amount required of a re^demptor, of all 
sums which the purchaser claims were necessary for maintenance, 
upkeep and repair of improvements to the property. Rather, it 
limits recovery to those sums which were reasonably devoted to 
such purposes. 
At the hearing before the lower court, 
defendant/appellant Merrill established, by unchallenged evidence, 
that CVF Land Investments1 expenditures on the Galloway property, 
even assuming for the sake of argument that they had been 
necessary for "maintenance, upkeep and repair of improvements", 
were wholly unreasonable. Charges by Cliff Johnson Excavating 
24 
Company for demolition alone (leaving out the 1400 tons of fill 
materials deposited on the property) was over $3,000.00--twice the 
amount which the only expert witness before the Court testified 
would be reasonable for such a job. 
The only evidence adduced by CVF Land Investment 
regarding the reasonableness of the charges incurred was Mr. 
Hansen's declaration that he had obtained two other bids before 
hiring Cliff Johnson Excavating. No testimony was offered as to 
who the other bids came from; what the amount thereof was; whether 
the amount charged by Cliff Johnson Excavating represented any 
sort of recognized standard in the industry (Mr. McCaughey in 
fact, directly rebutted this); or anything else which might have 
given the lower court guidance in assessing the objective 
reasonableness of the urged charges. Defendant/Merrill was 
precluded, however, from bringing this lack of evidence to the 
Court's attention, due to the court's refusal to accept closing 
argument before issuing its ruling. 
It is submitted, in short, that the Court's 
decision that charges incurred by CVF Land Investment in their 
development of the Galloway property (even if necessary) were 
"reasonable" was unsustained by any evidence whatever. On this 
basis alone, the court's ruling must be reversed. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT RECEIVED THE "BENEFIT" OF 
CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY IS BOTH IRRELEVANT 
AND UNTRUE 
While it paid lip service to the legal requirements 
of reasonableness and necessity in conjunction with CVF Land 
Investment's claimed charges, the trial court plainly ruled based 
on the impression that, since CVF Land Investment had put $13,000 
worth of improvements into the property, and since 
defendant/appellant Merrill now wished to redeem that property, 
she was ipso facto receiving the "benefit" of the pre-redemption 
development, and should be required to pay for it. This 
conclusion not only ignores applicable law, but is not based on 
any evidence presented during the hearing. 
As already noted, the statutory test for 
recoverability of expenditures as part of the redemption figure is 
strictly limited—the purchaser may recoup only reasonable sums 
expended for the necessary maintenance, upkeep and repair of 
improvements on the property (in other words, maintaining the 
status quo ante pending the expiration of the redemption period). 
A purchaser may not undertake major development during a 
redemption period, either with the assurance that an aspiring 
redemptor will act as the purchaser's "guarantor" in the event of 
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redemption, or for the purpose of defeating redemption by making 
it cost prohibitive. That the redemptor may (or may not--see 
below) receive the "benefit" of pre-redemption development is not 
a qualifying factor. 
Neither is it invariably true. In this case, there 
was no evidence that CVF Land Investments' depositing of 1,400 
tons of seven-dollar-per-ton fill material on the Galloway 
property in any way furthered defendant/appellant Merrill's 
intended use of the property, enhanced its value by $13,000 (or by 
any other figure), or otherwise inured to defendant/appellant's 
benefit in any way. Indeed, had defendant/appellant Merrill been 
aware that the court even regarded the supposed "benefit" issue to 
be relevant, she would have presented testimony that she intended 
no use of the Galloway property which entailed the raising of its 
entire grade to the level of surrounding streets, could not (by 
reason of CVF Land Investments' development work) sell the 
Galloway property to a third-party purchaser for appreciably more 
money, and in fact did not benefit in any respect from the 
development work undertaken. 
The value of the work done during the redemption 
period inured to CVF Land Investment alone; as redemptor, Marcia 
Merrill will realize none of that value either through the use or 
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sale of the Galloway property, and should not be required to pay 
it as part of the redemption amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The purchaser of property at a sheriff1 s sale is 
subject, for six months following the purchase, to junior 
lienholders1 statutory rights of redemption. During the 
redemption period, the purchaser proceeds with property 
development at his own risk; by law, he may not exact 
reimbursement for his development costs as the price of 
redemption. Rather, he is limited to specific amounts set by 
statute, which include only sums expended for necessary 
maintenance, upkeep and repair of existing improvements on the 
property as of date of sale. To be recoverable, moreover, such 
sums must be reasonable in amount. 
The lower court, simply put, ignored the foregoing 
standard completely. It burdened defendant/appellant Marcia S. 
Merrill with the entire cost of post-sale, pre-redemption 
improvements undertaken by CVF Land Investment on the Galloway 
property. The work performed was not considered in terms of 
actual necessity; neither were the amounts expended evaluated in 
terms of reasonableness. The court concluded only that CVF Land 
Investment (or more properly a contracting real estate broker) may 
have believed that the re-grading of the Galloway property to have 
28 
been a City requirement (a fact nowhere established of record, and 
directly contradicted by expert testimony and the unambiguous 
language of applicable ordinances), and that, as redemptor, Marcia 
S. Merrill might benefit from the pre-redemption work performed 
(again, nowhere established of record). 
The lower court committed manifest error in 
saddling defendant/appellant Merrill with CVF Land Investments' 
development costs on the Galloway property during the redemption 
period. Defendant/appellant Merrill is entitled to a reversal of 
the lower court's order, and a remand of this case for 
recalculation of the redemption amount in accordance with the law, 
and with the evidence presented at the September 13, 1989 hearing. 
DATED this j ^ day of January, 1990. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTKEN 
VINCENT^ef. ^ M P TON 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant Marcia S. Merrill 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or 
employed by the law firm of WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN, 310 South Main 
Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said 
capacity and pursuant to Rule 21(d) Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, a true copy of the attached Appellant's Brief was caused 
to be served upon: 
Jax H. Pettey 
180 South 300 West, #313 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in 
the U. S. Mails, postage prepaid thereon this if/ day of 
January, 1990. 
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successive weeks immediately preceding the sale, 
in some newspaper published in the county, if 
there is one. 
(2) Postponement If at the time appointed 
for the sale of any real or personal property on 
execution the officer shall deem it expedient and 
for the interest of all persons concerned to post-
pone the sale for want of purchasers, or other 
sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from 
time to time, until the same shall be completed; 
and in every such case he shall make public dec-
laration thereof at the time and place previously 
appointed for the sale, and if such postponement 
is for a longer time than one day, notice thereof 
shall be given in the same manner as the original 
notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property un-
der execution must be made at auction to the 
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock 
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property 
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more 
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the exe-
cution nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, 
or be interested in any purchase at such sale. 
When the sale is of personal property capable of 
manual delivery it must be within view of those 
who attend the sale, and it must be sold in such 
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; 
and when the sale is of real property, consisting 
of several known lots or parcels, they must be 
sold separately; or when a portion of such real 
property is claimed by a third person, and he re-
quires it to be sold separately, such portion must 
be thus sold. All sales of real property must be 
made at the courthouse of the county in which 
the property, or some part thereof, is situated. 
The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real 
or personal, shall be sold, when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of 
articles which can be sold to advantage sepa-
rately, and the officer must follow such direc-
tions. 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid 
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the 
purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him 
for the property struck off to him at a sale under 
execution, the officer may again sell the property 
at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss 
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, 
in addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of 
a contempt of court and may be punished accord-
ingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the offi-
cer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject 
any other bid of such person. 
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser 
of any personal property pays the purchase 
money, the officer making the sale shall deliver 
the property to the purchaser (if such property is 
capable of manual delivery) and shall execute 
and deliver to him a certificate of sale and pay-
ment. Such certificate shall state that all right, 
title and interest which the debtor had in and to 
such property on the day the execution or attach-
ment was levied, and any right, title and interest 
since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser. 
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real prop-
erty the officer shall give to the purchaser a cer-
tificate of sale, containing: ( D a particular de-
scription of the real property sold; (2) the price 
paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold sepa-
rately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to 
the effect that all right, title, interest and claim 
of the judgment debtor in and to the property j. 
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where 
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall 
be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate 
shall be filed for record by the officer in the offiCe 
of the recorder of the county. The real property 
sold shall be subject to redemption, except where 
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two. 
years' unexpired term, in which event said sale 13 
absolute. 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be 
redeemed by the following persons or their suc. 
cessors in interest: < 1) the judgment debtor; (2)
 a 
creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage 
on the property sold, or on some share or part 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property 
was sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of 
redemption the person seeking the same may 
make payment of the amount required to the per-
son from whom the property is being redeemed, 
or for him to the officer who made the sale, or his 
successor in office. At the same time the redemp. 
tioner must produce to the officer or person from 
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his 
notice to the officer: (Da certified copy of the 
docket of the judgment under which he claims 
the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the 
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an 
assignment, properly acknowledged or proved 
where the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount then actually due on the 
lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be 
paid. The property may be redeemed from the 
purchaser within six months after the sale on 
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent 
thereon in addition, together with the amount of 
any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum 
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, 
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the 
property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such 
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking 
redemption, other than the judgment under 
which said purchase was made, the amount of 
such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to 
whether any sum demanded for redemption is 
reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemp-
tion may pay the amount necessary for redemp-
tion, less the amount in dispute, to the court out 
of which execution or order authorizing the sale 
was issued, and at the same time file with the 
court a petition setting forth the item or items 
demanded to which he objects, together with his 
grounds of objection; and thereupon the court 
shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of 
such objections. A copy of the petition and order 
fixing time for hearing shall be served on the 
purchaser not less than two days before the day 
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the 
court shall enter an order determining the 
amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the 
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption 
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18.64.030 
request which is acceptable to the building offi-
cial. A copy of the relocation plan must be deliv-
ered to each tenant. If the building official 
becomes aware that the relocation plan has not 
been delivered to the tenants, and/or is not being 
followed, the credit shall be forfeited. (Ord. 88-85 
§3, 1985: prior code §5-8-3) 
18.64.040 Closing of sewer lateral and 
utilities. 
Prior to the commencement of any demoli-
tion or moving, the permittee must plug all sewer 
laterals at or near sidewalk lines as staked out by 
the department of public utilities. No excavation 
shall be covered until such plugging is approved 
by the department or by the building official. The 
permittee shall further insure all utility services 
to the structure and/or premises have been shut 
off and meters removed prior to commencement 
of work. (Ord. 88-85 §4,1985: prior code § 5-8-4) 
18.64.050 Site treatment after completion of 
project. 
A permit for demolition requires that all mate-
rials comprising part of the existing structure^), 
including the foundation and footings, must be 
removed from the site. The depression caused by 
removal of such debris must be filled back and 
compacted to the original grade, as approved by 
the building official, with fill material excluding 
detrimental amounts of organic material or 
large-dimension nonorganic material. The dem-
olition work must be completed, include filling 
and leveling back to grade and removal of 
required pedestrian walkways and fences, within 
the permit period provided in Section 302(d) set 
out in Section 18.64.010, or its successor, unless 
the building official finds: 
A. That any part of the foundation or build-
ing or site will form an integral part of a new 
structure to be erected on the same site for which 
plans have already been approved by the build-
ing division, in which case he/she may approve 
plans for appropriate adjustment, and may 
impose reasonable conditions including the 
posting of a bond, erection of fences, securing, 
etc., to guarantee the site does not create a haz-
ard: 
B. That new construction will shortly com-
mence and approves the continuance of the pro-
tective pedestrian walkway. (Ord. 88-85 § 5, 
1985: prior code §5-8-5) 
18.64.060 Enforcement exceptions—Appeal 
rights. 
A. Enforcement Exceptions. Properties 
involved in enforcement action by the city which 
result in city-sponsored demolition pursuant to 
this title, the Uniform Housing Code, or the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings Code, are 
relieved of the obligation set forth in Uniform 
Building Code Section 302(b)(2) to (d) and (e), as 
set out in Section 18.64.010 of this chapter, or 
successor sections. 
B. Right to Appeal. All parties impacted by 
this chapter can appeal the provisions thereof to 
the housing advisory and appeals board (HAAB) 
as follows: 
1. The owner of a property which is to be 
demolished may appeal the provisions of Sec-
tions 18.64.010, 18.64.020 and 18.64.050 of this 
chapter, or successor sections. A party who has a 
financial or legal interest in the proposed demoli-
tion may appeal the building official's decision. 
All appeals of this chapter will be made to the 
HAAB. The HAAB may overrule the building 
official or otherwise may grant relief upon evi-
dence of extreme hardship, technical constraints, 
or other special mitigating circumstances. It may 
waive the landscape requirement or grant less-
than-full compliance. In granting relief from the 
landscaping requirement, the HAAB shall con-
sider the impact that noncompliance, or less-
than-full compliance, would have on the area in 
which the building is located. 
a. An owner claiming a hardhip or other spe-
cial circumstance exists may file an appeal with 
the building official on a form provided in the 
division of building and housing services. 
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NOTICE OF REAL ESTATE SALE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District In and for 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
GUilOA M. GALLOWAY and LAURENCE GALLOWAY 
VS 
ROWLAND It. MERRILL, JR.; GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY 
OF UTAH, Trustee; BRIAN STEFFEMSEN, Attorney at Law, 
LAND ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; JOSEPH 
R. BRUNETTI; ROBERT L. LORD; ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney 
at Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney at Law; APOSHIAN, 
SNIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN HOTEL 
DEVELOrCP.:, INC.; NORTH TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER 
DE'COR, INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE STATE 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. 
BROWN; and JOHN DOES 1-10 
ORDER OF SALE 
DISTRICT COURT 
CIVIL NO. C88-1017 
To bo sold at Sheriff's Sale at the County Courthouse, ZhO East ^00 South In 
the Third District Court Building, 2nd door. In the City and County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, on the 28th day of February, 1989 at 12 o'clock noon of said 
day, all right, title and interest of said defendant , In and to that certain 
piece or parcel of real property situate In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described 
as follows, to-wi t: 
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 
and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22, 
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKYS FOURTH ADDITION; thence 
South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet: thence North 
23 feet; thence West 14 feet; thence North 33 feet; 
thence East 150 feet to BEGINNING. 
Purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 26th day of January 1939 
II.D. "f'LTE" IIAYWARD, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Sta'te/of Utah. 
Dy 
TCEITH L. BUCKN 
JAX H. PETTEY Docket No. 
KNW 
7906 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
>t
—"""Deputy Sheriff 
Date of first publication 2-3-89 
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REAL ESTATE, ORDER OF SALE RETURH 
In the District Court 
STATE OF UTAH J ^ SHERIFF'S OFFICE CIVIL No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ' C88-1017 
I hereby certify and return that I received the attached Order of Sale and 
Decree of Foreclosure on the 25th day of January, 1989 
I posted written Notice particularly describing said property for Twenty-
one days In three public places of the Precinct where the same is situated, on 
the property and In the County Courthouse at the place of sale. I published a 
copy of the notice once a week for four successive weeks preceding said sale in 
the Salt Lake Times
 f a newspaper of general circulation published in the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, proof of such publication being attached. 
On the 28th day of February, 1989 at 12:00 o'clock noon of said day I did 
attend and offered for sale at public auction the property as described and sold 
the same to Gloria Ruiz dba CVFLAND Investment Co. 
for the sum of $28,000.00 lawful money of the United States; said purchaser 
being the highest bidder. 
I have given to said purchaser a Certificate of Sale and have caused a dup-
licate Certificate to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of 
Utah. 
I herewith return said Order of Sale to court without further service by me, 
with judgment fully satisfied as follows, to-wit: 
Principal $ 17,202.11 Commission $ 425.00 
Interest 3,671.08 Overbid $ 512.13 
Attorneys fees 2,859.99 Overbid turned over to Clerk of 
C o s t s 286.50 Court-Check attached. 
Sheriffs fees 171.86 
Late fees 507.50 
Taxes 2,363.83 
Total judgment $ 27,062.87 
Bid $ 28,000.00 
Oated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of March, 1989 
N.D. "Pete" Hayward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
By \( ? "(A <^ JUvC \ ^ \ Deputy Sheriff 
KEITH L. BUCKNER' oe;.<TIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY Or , 
Docket No. 7906 -VAGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE TH;--
~~~ DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE C 
JTAH. / , ^  " ^~^ / 
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Telephone (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and ) 
LAURENCE GALLOWAY, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) CERTIFICATE OF FILING OF 
vs. • ) NOTICE OF INTENT TO REDEEM 
ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.; ) 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, ) 
Trustee; BRIAN STEFFENSEN, ) 
Attorney at Law; LAND ) 
ACQUISITION AND DEVVELOPMENT ) 
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI; ) 
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at ) Civil No. C88-1017 
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney ) 
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN & ) 
ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN ) Judge Scott Daniels 
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH ) 
TEMPLE LTD.7 PLASTER DE'COR, ) 
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE ) 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE ) 
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN; ) 
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main, Suite 1200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah and that the attached Notice of defendant 
Marcia S. Merrill's Intent to Redeem in the above-entitled matter 
was caused to be filed with the office of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff by hand delivery on the 25th day of August, 1989. 
1989 
VTNCEN^S^^KNIPTON 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn t o before me t h i s 25th day of August, 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
June 27, 1991 
2 
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Telephone (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
W — 
f Si 
in • 
D 
0 
in tf 
< 
< 
in 
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and 
LAURENCE GALLOWAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.; 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 
Trustee; BRIAN STEFFENSEN, 
Attorney at Law; LAND 
ACQUISITION AND DEWELOPMENT 
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI; 
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at 
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney 
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN & 
ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN 
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH 
TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER DE'COR, 
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN; 
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, %J
 {J 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION 
OF REDEMPTION AMOUNT 
Civil No. C88-1017 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Btfj. ij}r t H\&T£ 
UPON. 
SINOT-OEPU 
fkasoJ 
ipt-GefKJABCt ^%tOUNTY. UTAH 
OEPUfv 
0\f fau* Q6fit C yP^-S J^ctjf/K^Jt 
Defendant Marcia S. Merrill, by counsel and pursuant to 
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions the court 
for a judicial determination of the full amount necessary to 
redeem, from the Sheriff's sale on February 28, 1989 in the 
above-entitled action, the following conducted parcel of real 
property, located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah: 
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20 and 
21, and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH 
ADDITION, according to the official plats 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22, 
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION; 
thence South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet; 
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14 feet; 
thence North 33 feet; thence East 150 feet to 
the point of BEGINNING. 
("The Galloway Property"). 
Defendant Marcia S. Merrill petition is based upon the 
following: 
1. The Galloway property was sold at Sheriff's sale to 
Gloria Ruiz dba C.V.F. Land Investments Co. by Sheriff's sale on 
February 28, 1989, (a copy of the recorded Notice of Sale is 
attached as Exhibit 1). 
2. The purchase price for the property at the Sheriff's 
sale was $28,000.00. 
2 
3. On or about August 17, 1989, counsel for Marcia S. 
Merrill notified C.V.F. Land Investment Co. of her intent to 
redeem the property under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. While, between August 17 and August 25, 1989, counsel 
for Marcia S. Merrill had conversations with a representative of 
C.B.S. Land Investment Co., no final agreement was reached with 
respect to the redemption of the Galloway property from sale, or 
the amount to be paid therefore. 
5. On August 25, 1989, counsel for Marcia S. Merrill 
contacted the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office for the purpose 
of finalizing redemption procedures, and was informed that C.V.F. 
Land Investment Co. was claiming the payment of taxes and 
improvement expenses on the Galloway property which had not 
theretofore been disclosed to Marcia S. Merrill or her counsel. 
6. Under law, August 25, 1989, is the last day for 
redemption from sale of the Galloway property. 
7. Marcia S. Merrill acknowledges the following amounts 
as necessary for redemption of the Galloway property from sale: 
A. Purchase price at execution sale -
$20,000.00 
3 
B. 6 percent surcharge required by Rule 
69(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
$1,680-00 
C. Interest at 10 percent per annum 
through August 25, 1989 - $1,447.41. 
D. Total - $31,127.41 
8. Defendant Marcia S. Merrill has made reasonable 
inquiry regarding further assessments and taxes against the 
Galloway property and had been notified that none were 
outstanding. 
9. Defendant Marcia S. Merrill objects to any further 
charges being included in the redemption amount, in that the 
surcharges have not been timely brought to her attention or 
established by proper documentation. 
10. The amount of $31,127.41 is herewith tendered into 
court. 
Wherefore, defendant Marcia S. Merrill petitions the court 
under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter an 
order fixing a time for hearing of defendant Merrill's objections 
to the claimed redemption amount for the Galloway property; to 
take such evidence as the court deems necessary, at the time that 
is established for the hearing, to determine the proper 
redemption amount for the Galloway property, and to enter an 
4 
appropriate order establishing said amount, all as provided by 
law. 
DATED this 25th day of August, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
VINCENT^ BRAMPTON 
Attorri^ y for Defendant 
Marcia S. Merrill 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of 
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, and that in said capacity had the foregoing 
Petition for Determination of Redemption Amount hand delivered 
to C.V.F. Land Investment Co., 1335 East 4130 South, Sal^ Lake 
City, Utah 84117 on August 25, 1989. 
VCR\PETRED.MSM 
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STATE OF UTAH 
SS* 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
I* KORTNEY A* SATO * being flrsi duiv sworn on cath depose and say* 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the Fifth Precinct* County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah* a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of 
service herein* and no* a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed PETITION FOR DETERMINATION * on the 25 day of 
AUGUST • 1989* tri served the same upon RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO** 
a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION * * by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said PETITION FOR DETERMINATION * 
for the defendant with RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO., a suitable person over the age of 
14 years* RESIDING ai: the usual Place of RESIDENCE of said defendant* personally 
this 28 day of AUGUST * 1989* at 1335 E* 4130 S* 
County of Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
I further certify that at the time of such service of the PETITION FOR DETERMINATION 
I endorsed the date and Place of service and added ay name and official title thereto* 
* of Redemption Amount Dated this 28 day of AUGUST * 1989 
JOHN A* SINDT 
Constable's Office* Salt Lake County 
Subscribed and s*orn to before me thi 
MY Commission Expires* April 1* 1992 
Fee's 
/ V £ Y.&/ 
s 28 day of AUGUST ^C^W9* \<y 
Notary Pub I it mty of Salt Lake 
* * » 
Service 
Hi lease 
TOTAL 
3.75 
3.75 
99100 15 HA COURT DATE! 9/13/89 
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Telephone (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and 
LAURENCE GALLOWAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.; 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 
Trustee; BRIAN STEFFENSEN, 
Attorney at Law; LAND 
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI; 
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at 
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney 
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN & 
ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN 
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH 
TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER DE'COR, 
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN; 
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, £J-,J( 
"Defendants. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO 
COURT 
Civil No. C88-1017 
Judge Scott Daniels 
OATE P'JP'fl TIMP /** 
UPON. 
SINOT-OEPI JU»-6ejj5«BLt^L_C3UNTY. U . TAH 
ITV 
TO; Gloria Ruiz dba C.V.F. Land Investment Company: 
Notice is hereby given that defendant Marcia S. Merrill has, 
as of the date of this notice, deposited with the Clerk of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the sum of $31,127.41, being the undisputed portion of the 
amount required to redeem from the Sheriff's sale of February 28, 
1989, the following described parcel of real property, located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20 and 
21, and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH 
ADDITION, according to the official plats 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22, 
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION; 
thence South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet; 
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14 feet; 
thence North 33 feet; thence East 150 feet to 
the point of BEGINNING. 
Said deposit was made in conjunction with defendant Merrill's 
petition for judicial determination of the amount required for 
redemption, as provided under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this 25th day of August, 1989. 
WATKISS & 
ITINCEN^V^AMPTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Marcia S. Merri l l 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of 
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, and that in said capacity had the foregoing 
Notice of Deposit to Court was hand delivered to C.B.F. Land 
Investments, 1335 East 4130 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 on 
August 25, 1989. 
VCR\HOTDIP.MSM 
3 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC 
98/25/89 TIME: 13:35 CLERK: JMB 
CASE: 886901017LM 
PLTFF/PETi GALLOWAY? GUNDA M. 
DFNDT/RES: MERRILL? ROWLAND H. JR. 
JUDGE: SCOH DANIELS 
Befiimini Bal: 31? 127.41 
PAYOR: MARCIA S MERRILL 
AMT. Received: 31?127.41 
Other TrstNO: 127 Check: 31?127.41 
End Balance: .00 
COURT TENDER 
Receipt No: 891646168 
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS RECEIPT 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC 
98/25/89 TIME: 13:35 CLERK: JMB 
CASE: 888981817LM 
PLTFF/PET: GALLOWAY? GUNDA M. 
DFNDT/RES: MERRILL? ROWLAND H. JR. 
JUDGE: SCOTT DANIELS 
Besirming Bal: 31i127.41 
PAYOR: MARCIA S MERRILL 
AMT. Received: 31?127.41 
Other TrstNO: 127 Check: 31?127.41 
End Balance: .38 
COURT TENDER 
Receipt No: 891648188 
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS RECEIPT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
I* KORTNEY A* SATO • being first duiv sworn on oath depose and say*" 
I am a duly 2PPo'\»A,~'i Deputy Constable of ihe Fifth Precinct, County of Salt Lake. 
S^ate of Utah* a citizen of vhe United States over the age of 21 years at the time of 
service herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT on the 25 day of 
AUGUST * 1989* and served the same upon RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO., 
a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT * by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT 
for the defendant with RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CW LAND INVESTMENT CO** a suitable person over the age of 
14 years* RESIDING at the usual Place of RESIDENCE of said defendant, personally 
this 28 day of AUGUST * 1989* at 1335 E* 4130 S* 
County of Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
I further certify that at the time of such service of the NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT 
I endorsed the date and Place of service and added my name and official title thereto* 
Liate6 this 28 day of AUGUST , 1989 
JOHN A* SINDT 
Constable's Office* Salt Lake County 
22fe£> <?Jte 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
MY Commission Expires* April 1* 1992* 
Deputy v ^ n V fi *S*. 
28 day of AUGUST ^ W ? ^ t y & % 
Notary Public [County of Salt Lake 
Fee's 
Service 
Mi leaqe 
TOTAL 
3*75 
\<rti}tt of u w 
s® 
'-tUMM** 
3.75 
99100 15 MA COURT DATEJ 9/13/89 
Attachment 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 1 
GUNDA M. 
LAURENCE 
VS. 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
* * * * * 
GALLOWAY and, ] 
GALLOWAY, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
ROWLAND H. MERRIL, JR.,; ] 
GUARDIAN 
TRUSTEE; 
ATTORNEY 
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 1 
BRIAN STEFFENSEN, 
AT LAW; LAND 
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY; 
ROBERT L. 
ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY 
SNIDEMAN 
AMERICAN 
JOSEPH R. BURNETTI; 
. LORD; ROBERT L. LORD 
AT LAW; ROBERT B. BROWN, 
AT LAW; APOSHIAN, 
& ASSOCIATES, INC.; 
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; ' 
NORTH TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER 
DE'COR, INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; ] 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF 
and JOHN 
UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN; 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
* * * * • 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
SALT LAKE CIT^  
September 13 
CASE NO. 
k 
3ISTRICT 
OF UTAH 
C88-
SCOTT DANIELS 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
i, UTAH 
, 1989 
-1017 
NORA S . WORTHEN, CSR, RPR 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
JAX H. PETTEY 
ORTON S> PETTEY 
3098 Highland Drive, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
I N D E X 
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Direct Examination By Mr. Pettey 4 
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J. D. HANSEN 
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Cross-Examination by Mr. Pettey 24 
CRAIG C. MERRILL 
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Cross-Examination by Mr. Pettey 27 
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY 
Direct Examination by Mr. Rampton 28 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Pettey 34 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Rampton 36 
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Cross-Examination by Mr. Pettey 39 
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23 
24 
25 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 13, 1989; P.M. SESSION 
2 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is Gunda 
3 M. Galloway and Lawrence Galloway versus Rowland H. Merril 
4 and others, C88-1017, as I understand it before the Court 
5 on a evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of 
6 redemption; is that correct? 
7 MR. RAMPTON: Correct, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Is the plaintiff ready to proceed? 
9 MR. RAMPTON: Well, it's not proceeding as 
10 plaintiff. This is the redemptor versus the purchaser. 
11 I THE COURT: You represent the — 
12 MR. RAMPTON: The proposed redemptor, Marcia 
13 Merrill. 
14 MR. PETTEY: Jax Pettey, and I represent the 
15 purchaser Gloria Ruiz. 
16 THE COURT: You can proceed. 
17 MR. RAMPTON: Your Honor, just briefly, because I 
18 know we are short on time, this is an evidentiary proceeding 
19 to help determine the redemption amount on a parcel of 
20 property located in Salt Lake County at 145 North on 
21 I Redwood Road. 
22 The property was sold in this action in a 
23 Sheriff's sale of February 28, 1989 to Gloria Ruiz 
24 d/b/a CVF Land Investment. Marcia S. Merrill holds a 
25 junior judgment lien against the property and wishes to 
1 redeem the property, which she filed a Notice of Intention 
2 to do so with the Sheriff on August 25, 1985, within the 
3 time period prescribed by law. 
4 The redemption amount, which she tendered at that 
5 time, was the sale price, which was $28,000, six percent, 
6 which is $1,680 interest on both of those figures at 10 
7 percent through August 25th, which came to $1,447.41. So 
8 the total tender was $31,127.41. 
9 On the day of redemption, I learned for the first 
10 time that an affidavit had been filed with the Salt Lake 
11 1 County Sheriff's Office by CVF Land Investment, claiming 
12 I that an additional $520 was due for taxes paid on the 
13 property during the redemption period, and also 12,900 some 
14 odd dollars, nearly $13,000, for necessary expenses incident 
15 to maintenance upkeep, and repair of the property. We had 
16 no information at that time as to whether or not these were 
17 valid charges, so we filed, or rather tendered, a deposit of 
18 redemption amount to the court, sought and obtained this 
19 hearing date. 
20 A few matters have since come to light, but I 
21 J think we can enter by stipulation, first of all, that the 
22 property was purchased by Gloria Ruiz. It was purchased for 
23 $28,000 at a Sheriff's sale on February 28; that the amount 
24 of the $31,127.41 has been deposited with the Court pursuant 
25 to this hearing; that in fact CVF Land Investment did pay 
n A i m r i n n n •» T-» 
1 property taxes during the redemption period in the amount of 
2 J $500.20. We don't challenge that, so that amount should be 
3 awarded in addition to what has already been tendered. 
4 THE COURT: Plus six percent of that? 
5 MR. RAMPTON: Plus six percent. 
6 THE COURT: Plus 10 percent? 
7 MR. RAMPTON: Right. 
8 THE COURT: So the question is the 12,000? 
9 J MR. RAMPTON: So the question is the repair. Rule 
10 69(f)(3) states the following: 
11 "The property may be redeemed from the 
12 purchaser within six months after the sale on 
13 paying the amount of his purchase with six 
14 percent thereon in addition, together with the 
15 amount of any assessment or taxes, and any 
16 reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary 
17 maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvement 
18 upon the property which the purchaser may have 
19 paid thereon after the purchase, with interest 
20 on such amounts." 
21 And it is our contention the evidence will not 
22 establish that the additional sums which have been claimed 
23 in this matter will require that — were not necessary. To 
24 the extent they may have been necessary, they are 
25 unreasonably high and should not be awarded any part of the 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 redemption amount. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Pettey? 
3 MR. PETTEY: Your Honor, we stipulate to those 
4 items that Mr. Rampton indicated that we would stipulate to. 
5 With respect to the additional $12,905, that was 
6 an expenditure made pursuant to a notice and order issued by 
7 Salt Lake City Corporation directing Gloria Ruiz to demolish 
8 certain structures on the property and then to comply with 
9 the proper ordinances and fill and grade and level the 
10 property. 
11 It is our intention to show that in fact that was 
12 done; that a reasonable amount was paid for those services 
13 and that she should in fact be compensated for that. 
14 We are ready to proceed. 
15 THE COURT: I think the sensible way is for you to 
16 proceed and establish what was done and why. 
17 MR. PETTEY: Okay, that's fine. We'd like to call 
18 Gloria Ruiz to the stand. 
19 THE COURT: Ms. Ruiz, if you will come up here and 
20 be sworn, please. 
21 GLORIA RUIZ, 
22 called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, being 
23 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
24 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. PETTEY: 
/"»/-\ i.*r% TT\ i 
1 Q Mrs. Ruiz, would you please state your name and 
2 J address for the court reporter. 
3 A Gloria Ruiz. 1335 East 4130 South. 
4 Q And what is your relationship with CVF Land? 
5 J A That is my company. 
6 J Q Okay. You did purchase property at 145 North 
7 I Redwood Road at a Sheriff's sale? 
8 A I did. 
9 Q How much did you pay for that purpose? 
10 A $28,000. 
11 Q All right. Subsequent to the purchase of that 
12 property, have you paid any additional sums? 
13 A Yes, I have paid the taxes for $505 or $504 I 
14 believe it was, and the demolition services and removing the 
15 house, and trees on the property, and I have got the letter 
16 from the sheriff to do. 
17 Q Okay. Why did you have those buildings 
18 demolished? 
19 A Well, I was told that it was a hazard to — 
20 MR. RAMPTON: I'm sorry, I need to interpose an 
21 objection. It calls for hearsay testimony from the City. 
22 THE COURT: Well, it can be admitted not as to the 
23 truthfulness of it; to explain why she did what she did. 
24 Overruled. 
25 You can proceed. 
THE WITNESS: That's why I did it because with the 
letter from the sheriff, I thought, well, somebody could get 
hurt there and I'd be liable for it. 
Q Okay. I show you a document and I'd like you to 
tell me if you are familiar with that document and exactly 
what it is? 
A It is a notice from the Sheriff's office, I guess, 
for Salt Lake to do that. 
Q Have you seen that before; that document? 
A I must have. I didn't bring my glasses and I 
can't really tell what I am reading. Very embarassing. 
Q Would you read what it says on the notice, at 
least the first — what the heading is on that document. 
MR. RAMPTON: Your Honor, I am going to object 
before the document comes into evidence or its contents. It 
needs to be offered. I believe this is a document that 
hasn't been authenticated. 
THE COURT: Well, sustained at this point. I 
don't think you should have her read from it until it's been 
admitted. 
MR. PETTEY: Your Honor, I'd like to submit for — 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. RAMPTON: This appears to be a document 
supposedly issued by Salt Lake City Corporation. It is not 
a certified document. There is no certification on it. 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
There is 
what it 
no authenticating witnesses to state that it is 
purports to bef so we object to its being 
MR. PETTEY: Mrs. Ruiz, 
THE COURT: Right. It 
necessarily for the truthfulness 
explain 
demoliti 
Q 
may I as 
why she did what she did, 
received. 
r I think you received it — 
will be admitted; not 
of its content, but to J 
» 
MR. PETTEY: You received it before you 
on done? 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
Better have it marked as Exhibit 1. 
(Plaintifffs 
had the 
Exhibit No. 1 was 
received in evidence.) 
(By Mr. Pettey) When you received this 
k what you then did with 
receiving the document? 
A 
I called 
Q 
who you 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
anything 
document, 
it, or did, pursuant to 
Well, I really didn't know what to do with it, so 
Jay and asked him about it. 
Would you please explain — identify to 
mean by Jay? 
He is the realtor that 
What is his full name? 
Jay Hansen. 
works with me. 
the court 
So you delivered that document to him, then? 
Yes, because I had not 
to the property until I 
expected to have 
would know if it 
to do 
was mine 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
or not. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
forward, 
you have 
A 
I thought this was strange. 
Did you contact the City yourself? 
No, I didn't. 
You did not? 
No. 
You turned the document over to? 
To Jay and asked him to do it for me. 
Okay. Now, were you involved, from that point 
with regard to arranging for the demolition, or did 
Mr. Hansen arrange for it? 
I had Mr. Hansen arrange it for me because I 
didn't know who to call. I didn't know anybody, what I 
should do with it. 
Q Let me ask you then, one additional question. Was 
the demolition work — was demolition work done on the 
property? 
A 
Q 
A 
the name 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
> 
Yes, it was. 
And who performed that work? 
Cliff Johnson I believe. I don't remember. It is 
of the person. 
Were you satisfied with the job that was done? 
Yes. 
Did you personally inspect that yourself? 
Yes. I went to see it because there was some old 
trees that had to be knocked down, and the house, and at the 
p r r n m nmr*r>_ * 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
time I th 
shouldn't 
Q 
Johnson f 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
thatf or 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
the payme 
received. 
ink there was some people living in the hoi 
have been there. 
Okay. Did you receive a bill, then, from 
or the services? 
I did. 
And did you pay for those services? 
I did. 
Would you be familiar with the billing if 
was that given to Mr. Hansen? 
It came to me. 
You did pay for it with a personal check? 
With a company check. 
ise t 
Mr. 
you 
:hat 
saw 
Okay. I have a copy of the check that she made 
nt with, your Honor. 
MR. RAMPTON: No objection, your Honor. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 was 
received in evidence.) 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
You better have it marked Exhibit 2. It will 
MR. PETTEY: Is that the check then that you ] 
Mr. Johnson with? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it is. 
Okay. Fine. Were there other items that 
anticipated doing to improve that property, besides 
you 
the 
be 
paid 
had 
1 demolition work? 
2 A I had thought that I would want to build onto it. 
3 That was my idea of purchasing it to begin with, because I 
4 wanted to build. 
5 Q You have not started construction on the premises? 
6 A No, absolutely not. 
7 Q Why have you not started construction? 
8 A I was waiting to see what was resolved. It wasn't 
9 mine until — 
10 Q You understood this property would not be yours 
11 until the six months redemption period was over? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. Fine. 
14 MR. PETTEY: I have no further questions of Mrs. 
15 Ruiz at this time, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 Mr. Rampton. 
18 MR. RAMPTON: J u s t a few, your Honor . 
19 fty t u r n , Mrs. R u i z . S o r r y . 
20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
22 Q Mrs. Ruiz, before the house on this property was 
23 demolished, did you go inside of it? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Did you ever go down in the lower story of it? 
1 A There was a basement down there, but I never went 
2 down. 
3 Q Do you know how deep it was? 
4 A No, I don't. 
5 Q Do you know how big the house was? 
6 A I don't know. It was a small house. I'd say 
7 probably four-room house. 
8 Q What other buildings were there on the lot besides 
9 the house? 
10 A Just the house and then old treesf ugly old trees. 
11 Q Speaking of the trees, you mentioned they needed 
12 to be torn down. What gave you to believe the trees had to 
13 be removed? 
14 A Well, to level it and — Okay. They said it was 
15 dangerous. Okay. Living at my house, I have seen where 
16 these old trees have broken and it could cause damage to 
17 anybody parked there, or even people passing. 
18 Q Who was it that told you the trees were dangerous? 
19 A No. I said that. 
20 Q No one told you they were a danger? 
21 A No. I just thought they'd have to be cleaned out. 
22 Q Did you — I want to make sure I understand your 
23 testimony. You say you handed this entire operation over to 
24 Jay Hansen once you received the notice that's been marked 
25 as Exhibit 1? 
r»Aunr iTiT?n_7kTnr 'n mn A M f p n TT»mT r\\i 1 1 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q So you never obtained any bids, yourself, on this 
3 demolition project? 
4 A No, I didn't. 
5 Q When you received the bill from the excavating 
6 company that performed the job, did you show it to any other 
7 company to find out if it was a reasonable bill? 
8 A I didn't know. 
9 Q Did you challenge him at all on it personally? 
10 A No, I didn't, because I am not aware of these 
11 things, how much it cost to do it or not. 
12 Q Did you have any discussion with the excavator as 
13 to what specificly needed to be done to comply with the 
14 notice you received? 
15 A No, I didn't. I thought Jay would do that. 
16 Q Did you have any discussion with anyone at all, 
17 before the job was done, about changing the grade of the 
18 entire lot? 
19 A I didn't. 
20 Q Mrs. Ruiz — if I may approach the witness, your 
21 Honor,. 
22 THE COURT Yes. 
23 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 3, 
24 which appears to be an appeal filed with Salt Lake City with 
25 respect to landscaping requirements. Do you recognize the 
P A i / n n m n n * -r I-N T-I T-V m-r 
document 
A 
at all? 
I think Jay brought this for me to see. And most 
of this six months I have been kind of ill, so I have just 
told him 
Q 
referring 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
document 
A 
to do what he had to do. 
But you do recall Mr. — that's Hansen you are 
[ to? 
Yes. 
He did show it to you? 
Yes. 
What was your understanding of the purpose of the 
when you received it? 
To go ahead and get that work done. If that's 
what we had to do, then do it. 
Q 
4, and as 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
that's or 
A 
remember. 
Let me show you now what's been marked as Exhibit 
k you if you have ever seen that before? 
Yes. 
When did you see it? 
I don't remember, but I got this. 
You did receive that letter? 
Yes. 
Do you think you received it about the dates 
i it, March 23rd of '89? 
I must have received it around there, but I don't 
MR. RAMPTON: I'd ask that Exhibit 3 and 4 be 
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received in evidence. 
and be 
Called 
first d 
BY MR. 
Q 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
PETTEY: 
COURT: 
Any objection? 
No objection. 
They will be received. 
(Defendants* Exhibit Nos. 3 
Were received in evidence.) 
PETTEY: 
COURT: 
PETTEY: 
COURT: 
That is all I have, your 
Any further questions, Mr, 
No, your Honor. 
You can step down. Thank 
(Witness excused.) 
COURT: 
PETTEY: 
Your Honor, 
THE 
sworn, 
COURT: 
please. 
and 4. 
Honor. 
Pettey? 
you. 
Any more witnesses, Mr. Pettey? 
Yes, your Honor. 
I'd like to call Jay Hansen. 
Mr. Hansen, if you will come up here 
J. D. HANSEN, 
as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, being 
luly sworn, was 
PETTEY 
Mr. 
examined and testified as 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
• 
• 
Hansen, 
and current address, 
A My i name is 
address is 4201 Cumbe 
follows: 
would you please state your full name 
for the record. 
J.D. Hansen. My address — 
rland Road, Salt Lake City 
- my home 
• 
1 Q And what is your profession, you are engaged in? 
2 A I am a real estate broker. 
3 J Q How many years have you been engaged in that 
4 I business? 
5 A 39 years. 
6 Q Are you familiar with both residential and 
7 commercial properties? 
8 A Yes, I am. 
9 I Q Are you — do you know Gloria Ruiz? 
10 A Yes, I do. 
11 Q What is your relationship with her? 
12 A Gloria Ruiz is a customer or client of mine. I 
13 have been working with her for several years in her real 
14 estate matters. 
15 Q Are you familiar with the property located at 145 
16 North Redwood Road? 
17 A Yes, I am. 
18 Q Would you have been involved with Mrs. Ruiz in 
19 that purchase — her purchase of that property? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q She has indicated that she had you carry on 
22 basically the situation with regards to the excavating and 
23 demolition of the property; is that correct? 
24 A That's right. 
25 Q Mr. Hansen, are you familiar with that document 
1 that I have just handed to you? 
2 A Yes, I am. 
3 Q^  This exhibit? 
4 And where did you first see that document? 
5 A I received a phone call from Mrs. Ruiz that she 
6 had received this document and I went to her place of 
7 business and she gave it to me at that time. 
8 Q What did you do, then, after you received the 
9 document? 
10 A I talked to the City about it. I went to the City 
11 offices, talked to Mr. Cupit about what was to be expected 
12 of us. 
13 Q Who is Mr. Cupit? 
14 A Well, I don't know his title. Isn't here, but 
15 he's — I think he is the legal officer or legal — not an 
16 attorney, but he has the responsibility with the Department 
17 of Building and Housing Services of inspecting and dealing 
18 with derelict properties, I guess. 
19 Q All right. And did you talk to him about Mrs. 
20 Ruiz's interest in that property? 
21 A Well, I indicated to him that she had purchased 
22 the property on the Sheriff's sale, and that she had 
23 intentions to develop the property, but that we, at this 
24 point, wanted — her intent would be to comply with the City 
25 requirements as far as this notice and order were concerned. 
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how 
with 
Q 
soon 
? 
Q 
Okay. And what did he tell you with respect to 
that 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
notice and order would need to be complied 
RAMPTON: Objection. Hearsay, your Honor. 
COURT: I think that would be hearsay. 
PETTEY: I will rephrase that, your Honor. 
Could you tell us a little bit about your 
discussion wi1 
that 
hear 
unde 
h^ him, what perhaps your understanding of what 
notice requiredf and what he told you it required? 
A 
say. 
Q 
Well, Mr. Cupit said — 
MR. 
THE 
(By 
rstanding 
MR. 
itself if it . 
had 
Cupi 
how 
for 
Q 
THE 
MR. 
RAMPTON: Objection, your Honor. Still 
COURT: Sustained. 
Mr. Pettey) Would you tell us what your 
is of that notice? 
RAMPTON: Objection. The notice speaks for 
Is in evidence. 
COURT: Sustained. 
PETTEY: Okay. 
After you received that notice from Mrs. Ruiz, and 
talked wil 
A 
th the City, what did you then do. 
Well, I — after meeting with the City, with Mr. 
t, they were — had expressed the intent that that — or 
do I 
them 
want to stay it? The property had been a problem 
for some time, and they were anxious to see that it 
1 was taken down. They had some law enforcement problems. 
2 They said the property was being occupied by vagrants, 
3 transients, and so they were — apparently had been a long 
4 I standing problem. 
5 THE COURT: Sustained. 
6 He just asked you what you did. He wants you to 
7 say what you did. Not what he told you. 
8 THE WITNESS: After meeting with Mr. Cupit and 
9 getting his point of view on the property, they're attitude. 
10 I contacted some contractors about the demolition. 
11 Q (By Mr. Pettey) How many contractors? 
12 A Three. 
13 Q And what did you solicit from those contractors? 
14 A I wanted a bid for demolition, cleaning up the 
15 lot, and bringing it up to grade. 
16 Q Explain what you mean by bringing it up to grade? 
17 A Well, there is in the City, with demolition — if 
18 you get a right to demolish a property, you have to meet the 
19 I City standards on grading. 
20 MR. RAMPTON: Objection, your Honor. The witness 
21 is testifying as if he is an expert on demolition and City 
22 requirements. He has not qualified himself as that. 
23 THE COURT: I think he can testify if he knows the 
24 answer. Overruled. 
25 THE WITNESS: The demolition or that is — there 
is a 
have 
land 
lawn 
property, 
have to p 
document 
plan r bas 
property 
be an imp 
were told 
scaping requirement which requires that the lot 
and sprinklers. They have — when you demolish a 
unless it is going to be put in immediate use, you 
rovide a landscaping plan. And I had submitted a 
which asked for exceptions to that landscaping 
ed on the fact that the intent was to develop the 
in a fairly early time, and that landscaping would 
ractical situation at this time. That's when we 
we had to fill the property, we had to grade it. 
MR. RAMPTON: Objection. Strike the last comment 
as hearsay. 
Q 
different 
A 
THE COURT: Sustained. It will be stricken. 
(By Mr. Pettey) When you contacted these three 
contractors, did you obtain bids from them? 
Yes, I did. I obtained bids from three 
contractors. 
her, 
did. 
Q 
A 
what 
Q 
A 
lowest fi< 
Q 
A 
And did you review those bids with Mrs. Ruiz? 
I believe I did. I believe I discussed that with 
I was getting in the way of bids. I am sure I 
Which bid did you accept, then? 
I accepted the bid from Cliff Johnson. It was the 
gure. 
His was in fact the lowest bid? 
Absolutely. 
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1 Q Did you give Mr. Johnson any specific instructions 
2 with respect to what type of fill material he was to use? 
3 A The City had specified in their order that there 
4 was a requirement that the fill had to be clean, and the 
5 aggregate not to exceed, that is the size of the aggregate 
6 not to exceed two inches, and that's the instruction I gave 
7 him. 
8 Q Those are the instructions that you gave to him? 
9 A That's right. 
10 Q And did you have any reason to doubt that the bid 
11 that he gave you was an unreasonable bid? 
12 A No. No, I didn't. 
13 Q And did Mr. Johnson complete that work? 
14 A He did. Very quickly and very efficiently. Very 
15 prompt, and it was well done. 
16 MR. PETTEY: Okay. I have no further questions, 
17 your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Rampton? 
19 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 0 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
21 Q Mr. Hansen, when you received a bill from Johnson 
22 Excavating, did you question the amount of it? 
23 A I knew what the bid was before he started. 
24 Q And it corresponded with the bid? 
25 A That's right. 
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Q 
MR. RAMPTON: May I see Exhibit 4, your Honor? 
Mr. Hansen, let me show you what's been received 
into evidence as Exhibit 4. Do you recognize that letter? 
A 
Q 
your te 
A 
Yes, I do. 
Does this letter refer to what you refer to in 
stimony as the landscaping requirement? 
Well, no. This is not the landscaping 
requirement. We had made an application for a variance of 
the Ian 
that — 
dscaping requirement. There are some other documents 
maybe they are easier to deal with on that 
situation. But I don't mean to go on here. 
Q 
letter 
talking 
A 
to the 
Q 
(By Mr. Rampton) My question was whether this 
referred to the landscaping requirement you were 
about or not? 
This is the — this letter grants the exceptions 
landscaping requirement and tells us what we must do. 
So this letter then was an exception from the 
landscaping requirement that you have testified to? 
A 
sprinkl 
Yeah. Which is sodding and all that business, and 
ing system. 
MR. RAMPTON: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything further of this witness? 
MR. PETTY: No. 
THE COURT: Anymore witnesses, Mr. Rampton? 
MR. RAMPTON: He may step down. 
1 Thank you, your Honor. 
2 (Witness excused.) 
3 Call Mr. Rowland H. Merrill, please. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Merrill. 
5 ROWLAND H. MERRILL, 
6 Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendant, being 
7 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
10 Q State your name for the record, please, sir. 
11 A Pardon? 
12 Q State your name for the record. 
13 A Rowland H. Merrill. 
14 Q Current address? 
15 A 1821 South Main Street, Salt Lake City. 
16 Q Mr. Merrill, were you the owner of a home at 145 
17 North Redwood Road in Salt Lake City? 
18 A Yes, I was. 
19 Q When was that? 
20 A I bought it in approximately 1978. I can't — it 
21 was the spring of the year, either '78 or '79, on a 
22 contract. 
23 Q And you owned it until the Sheriff's sale in 
24 February; is that correct? 
25 A Yes, I did. 
rOMPTTTPR-ZvTnPn TD aMCPDTDmTAM 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Did you ever occupy it? 
No. 
Did you ever go inside? 
Yes. 
Are you familiar with the size of the home? 
Yes. 
How big was it? 
I'd guess it is between 700 and 750 square feet. 
Is there any way it could have been more than 800 
square feet? 
A 
to count 
I doubt it. If they did that, I think they'd have 
some things that I didn't count as part of the 
house, such as the front porch. I don't even think they'd 
get over 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
may have 
800. 
Was there a full basement in the home? 
No. 
What was underneath the main floor? 
To my knowledge, there was a crawl space and they 
dug a space out underneath the home for some sort 
of storage underneath. 
Q 
A 
Q 
How deep would that have been? 
Under six feet, five, six feet. 
Mr. Merrill, I want to show you three photographs 
and ask you if you recognize the home that's depicted in 
those photographs? Do you recognize what is on those 
rOMPTTTF.R-ATnF.n TR AMQPRTPTTOM 2 1 
1 J pictures? 
2 A Yes. I believe it is the house we are talking 
3 about. I am trying to look at some other identifying 
4 things, because there are several houses around there that 
5 are the same. I didn't realize this was painted that color. 
6 Q Let me receive those back for now, if I may. 
7 Thank you. 
8 The land around the house, during the time that 
9 you owned it, was it on a level with the adjacent Redwood 
10 Road, or was it lower? 
11 I A It was a little bit lower than Redwood Road. 
12 Q Was the land around the house itself level? 
13 A Somewhat level. I think it sloped up a little bit 
14 in the back. But it was pretty close to level. 
15 Q Was it fairly flat in the immediate vicinity of 
16 the house, is what I am asking? 
17 A Yes. 
18 MR. RAMPTON: I have no further questions, your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Pettey, any questions? 
21 MR. PETTEY: Just one. 
22 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 3 BY MR. PETTEY: 
24 Q Would you clarify, when you say it is sloped, do 
2 5 you mean it sloped up or down? 
1 A It is sloped — Redwood Road is something like 
2 this, then it goes off like that. The property is down here 
3 and it is sloped upward toward the back. 
4 1 Q It is sloped up toward the back? 
5 A Toward the road? 
6 I Q The majority of it was below the Redwood Road? 
7 I A Below the asphalt level, yes. 
8 MR. RAMPTON: Nothing further. 
9 THE COURT: Anymore questions? 
10 MR. RAMPTON: Nothing further, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You can step down. 
12 (Witness excused.) 
13 MR. RAMPTON: Call Craig R. Merrill to the stand, 
14 please. 
15 I THE COURT: Mr. Merrill, if you would come up here 
16 and be sworn, please. 
17 CRAIG C. MERRILL, 
18 Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendants, 
19 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
20 follows: 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
23 Q State your name for the record, please, sir. 
24 A Craig C. Merrill. 
25 Q And your current address? 
r O M P n T F . R - A T D F n TR ANQPR TPTTONJ 2 5 
1 A 1082 East Birchbrook Circle in Midvale. 
2 Q Let me show you photographs which have been marked 
3 for identification as Exhibit 5, 6 and 7 and ask you if you 
4 recognize those photographs? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did you take them? 
7 A My daughter took them. 
8 Q Were you present when she took them? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Do you recognize the house that is depicted in the 
11 photographs? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Where is it? 
14 A The house is located at immediately north of the 
15 property that we have been talking about. I think it is 171 
16 North Redwood Road. 
17 Q Did you personally see the home located at 145 
18 North Redwood Road before it was demolished? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Is there any similarity between the home that was 
21 J demolished and the home we are looking at in this picture? 
22 A To my recollection, those homes were essentially 
23 twins. 
24 Q I'd ask that Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 be received in 
25 evidence, your Honor. 
PAmrnnrm 
BY MR. 
Q 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
PETTEY: 
COURT: 
PETTEY 
COURT: 
COURT: 
COURT: 
PETTEY 
COURT: 
» 
Any objection? 
: No, your Honor. 
They will be received. 
(Defendants1 Exhibit Nos. 5f 6 and 7. 
Were received in evidence.) 
That's all I have of this witness. 
Any questions, Mr. Pettey? 
: Yes. Just one, your Honor. 
He has a question for you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
This particular property which you indicate is 
just north of 
A 
Q 
Yes 
the su 
• 
bject property at 145 North? 
Is that lot on the same or was that lot on 
same level as the pr 
demolished, or is it 
A 
little 
Street, 
operty that was — the home that 
lower or higher? 
the 
was 
It is lower than Redwood Road. You do go down a 
bit into the 
, which 
say for sure, 
property was, 
My feeling is 
MR. 
THE 
is the 
but I 
property. It is also lower than Ge r t i e 
street that separates them. I couldn't 
think it is lower than the Galloway 
or about the same, or perhaps slightly 
it is 
PETTEY 
COURT: 
reasonably close. 
: Okay. No further questions. 
Any questions? 
higher. 
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1 MR. RAMPTON: No, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you. 
3 (Witness excused.) 
4 MR. RAMPTON: Call John Henry McCaughey to the 
5 standf please. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. — say it again. 
7 MR. RAMPTON: McCaughey. If you will come up here 
8 and be sworn, please. 
9 JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY, 
10 Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendants, 
11 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
12 follows: 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
15 Q If you would state your name and spell your last 
16 name for the reporter. 
17 A John Henry McCaghey M.C.C.A.U.G.H.E.Y. 
18 Q What is your current address, sir? 
19 A 588 East Vine, Number 2-B, Murray, Utah. 
20 Q And your current occupation? 
21 J A I am a demolition contractor. 
22 Q What company are you with? 
23 A Northern Nevada Construction. 
24 Q What is your position with the company? 
25 A I am the General Manager and Vice-president. 
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Q 
A 
shop, ha 
mean, I 
Briefly, describe your duties. 
Bid all of our work. I am the dispatcher, run the 
ndle all the maintenance. I am general manager. I 
sign all the checks, hire, fire, profit and loss is 
my responsibility. 
Q 
A 
people t 
Q 
A 
Q 
in that 
A 
Q 
you can 
A 
We j us t 
building 
Securiti 
Do you still do onsite work as well? 
Yes. When necessary. When I don't have enough 
o do go around, I do the work myself. 
How long have you been a demolition excavator? 
About seven years. 
How many projects would you say you have handled 
time? 
1,500. 
Have you any recent projects you have done which 
identify for the Court? 
We are just finishing doing the Centre Theater. 
finished digging the hole. We tore down that 
there. We are doing the Gordon Place for Zions 
es Finance 15 holes we are finished tearing out. We 
just tore down part of Hillcrest Junior High School for 
remodeli 
Q 
question 
ng. 
Thank you. I want to ask you a hypothetical 
based on your experience in the demolition expert 
estimation business. I want you to assume a private 
residence of not more than 800 square feet composed of clap 
nrwm n rnT?o_ * • 
1 board, one story structure with a crawl space of not more 
2 than six feet deep underneath, which you are required to 
3 demolish and fill the remaining hole. Do you have an 
4 opinion as to what you would bid that project at? 
5 A Well, I just did two, two weeks ago that fit that 
6 description exactly. I did them each for $1,500. 
7 Q Does that include the hauling, supplying of fill 
8 material? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q I want you, if you will, to look at the paragraphs 
11 that are in front of you, which have been received as 
12 Exhibits 5, 6 and 7. Before you talk about those, let me 
13 ask you another question. Have you visited the site at 145 
14 North on Redwood Road? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Do you recognize the house that is depicted in the 
17 three photographs before you? 
18 A Well, it looks a lot like the house just to the 
19 north of that address. 
20 Q You saw that house while you were there? 
21 A Yes. It is just on the side there is a little 
22 alleyway there. I took a peek over there. 
23 Q Is the bid that you just described, the $1,500 
24 bid, could that hold true for demolishing this house which 
25 you are looking at? 
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1 A Well, I could do it for that. It would help if I 
2 knew who I was bidding against, then I'd know how high I 
3 J could go, I could do this job for 1,500 easy. 
4 Q What do you base 1,500 on? 
5 I A Well, it is kind of a — on bigger projects, we 
6 I bid our job by the cubic yard. We determine how many cubic 
7 I yards of debris is in the project. We have a unit price for 
8 the cubic yard. And for that house, that equasion wouldn't 
9 I work because there is so few cubic yards of house, in the 
10 trash, that it wouldn't cover our mobilization cost. So we 
11 basically do houses on — we have fixed costs for houses 
12 ranging from a thousand dollars to $2,500 depending on the 
13 size of the house, and the location of the house, and 
14 whether it has got a full basement underneath it or whether 
15 or not we are going to be required by the owner the fill the 
16 basement, or — you see what I am saying. 
17 Q Yes. So it would be bid on a piece basis rather 
18 than a yardage basis? 
19 A Right. 
20 Q How about the fill, your $1,500 assumption, what 
21 kind of fill work? 
22 A Well, the City requires that if you are going to 
23 change the grade, any grade change of the project over two 
24 feet, you have to make up that two feet. Which, of a house 
25 like this — I mean, I checked this house out the other day 
when I was over there looking at 145. It has got a crawl 
space underneath it, so we would plan on filing the crawl 
space up right to whatever the grade around the house was, 
because that's what the City would require. A house like 
this would take maybe 60, 70 yards of fill. Wefd roll it in 
with a Cat and that would be that. 
Q You testified a moment ago about City 
requirements. What is your understanding, as a cost 
estimator, of City requirements where a house is demolished, 
what do you have to do as far as fill and grading at that — 
after that point? 
A Well, like I said, what they are predominantly 
looking for, they don't want any steep dropoffs or any 
hazardous situation being the result of a demolition job, so 
they have got that two-foot requirement. The two foot cut 
off, if you can slope it off the crawl space and it doesn't 
result in more than a two-foot grade variation, then you 
don't have to fill it at all. But if you are going to 
produce a grade variation where the house was, or if you are 
going to produce a grade variation anywhere, you have to 
make up that difference with fill. 
Q Is there any requirement in the City that after a 
house is demolished, the entire lot must be changed in grade 
to that of surrounding sites? 
A No. 
rnWPTTTF.R-ATm?n fPDAMCPDTOTTnM ^O 
Q 
you don't 
project? 
A 
Q 
So if a house sits lower than a surrounding site, 
have to fill that in as part of the demolition 
No. 
Is tree removal a requirement of the City in 
conjunction with a demolition project? 
A 
ordinance 
keep land 
why the C 
prior to 
waivers, 
cut down, 
going to 
these day 
Well, quite the opposite. The whole landscape 
that went into effect in 1986 was an attempt to 
scaping and trees growing in the City. So that's 
ity is requiring people to post landscape plans 
getting demolition permits. 
Now, a lot of people get around that with weed 
you know, by saying well, we will keep the weeds 
because they can convince the City that they are 
have a future project. But even the weed waivers 
s are hard to come by. And in most cases, if you 
don't have a landscape bond, you have to have your new plans 
approved 
tear a pi 
to get it 
for a new project before they will even let you 
ace down. 
In the case of this, where there was an order out 
demolished, they are a lot more lenient with their 
weed waivers, because if it goes too far the City is going 
to condemn the property. And City projects are exempt from 
the landscape ordinance, and so they have — you know, they 
could — I think they could see one step beyond this one, 
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1 just gave him the weed waiver and let him knock it down. 
2 MR. RAMPTON: I don't have anymore questions of 
3 this witness. 
4 THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Pettey? 
5 MR. PETTEY: Yes, your Honor. 
6 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. PETTEY: 
8 Q Mr. McCaughey, did you ever inspect or see this 
9 property prior to the time that the demolition occurred? 
10 A Oh, I have seen it but I didn't inspect it. 
11 Q Had you seen it when it did have buildings on it? 
12 A Uh-huh. 
13 Q Okay. Were you aware of how many structures were 
14 on the property? 
15 A Well, to the best of my knowledge, there was a 
16 house up front and had a little garage, had a little shed, I 
17 think. There was a little root cellar or something out 
18 there. I bid on that Casablanca Motel which was right 
19 around that Norwood Club from where that house was. There 
20 was a house right behind that one that had to come out with 
21 that project, so I was kind of traipsing all over that place 
22 about a year ago. 
23 Q You have been on the property since the demolition 
24 has occurred, and the grading? 
25 A Yes. 
1 Q So you are familiar with the fill that is there 
2 now? 
3 A Uh-huh. (Affirmative) 
4 1 Q If you had done the demolition work and brought in 
5 J the fill, the same type of fill, same quality, et cetera, 
6 and done that job comparable to what was done, do you have 
7 an estimate as to what you would have charged for that type 
8 of service? 
9 MR, RAMPTON: I am going to object to the 
10 question. There is no evidence this man knows exactly what 
11 I was done. He said he hasn't been on the site since the 
12 project was completed. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I think if he was out there he 
14 probably has an idea. If you can answer the question, you 
15 can. If it is not possible, then, just say so. 
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it is kind of hard to bid on a 
17 job that has already happened. But, at the time — at the 
18 time that this job occurred, I could tell you what I would 
19 have bid. I would have bid 1,800 bucks because that's what 
20 I was bidding on houses at the time. 
21 THE COURT: To do everything that was done, 
22 including removing the trees? 
23 THE WITNESS: No, not including removal of the 
24 trees. 
25 THE COURT: Including everything that was done, is 
1 what he wants to know. What would have you charged for the 
2 same thing? 
3 THE WITNESS: $2f500. 
4 Q (By Mr. Pettey) Including bringing in the amount 
5 of fill? 
6 A What amount? 
7 Q Well, I guess I am asking the amount of fill that 
8 was brought in, your not familiar with that? 
9 A Well, I would have just filled the crawl space 
10 under the house. 
11 THE COURT: He wants to know what you would have 
12 charged, what was actually done. 
13 THE WITNESS: What was done? 
14 THE COURT: If you don't know, I guess — 
15 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
16 MR. PETTEY: I thought perhaps he was aware of 
17 that. No further questions. 
18 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Rampton? 
19 MR. RAMPTON: Just a couple of questions. 
20 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
22 Q You testified, regarding cross-examination, in th 
23 past you observed a couple of additional buildings on the 
24 property that was occupied by this house, that was torn 
25 down; is that correct? 
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1 A Yeah. I think it had its own garage. I am pretty 
2 sure it had a little garage on back. 
3 Q I want you now to assume your estimate has to 
4 include taking down those out buildings as well. How would 
5 that alter it? 
6 A Well, that's why I said $1,800 because I figured 
7 I the garage and that little shed was worth about two loads, 
8 I and I figure $100 a load over my base price. 
9 I Q So wouldn't change? 
10 A No, not appreciably. The only thing that really 
11 J changed it was his comment about the trees. 
12 Q How many tons of fill material in a cubic yard? 
13 A Per K.Y.? 
14 Q Uh-huh. 
15 A About a ton and a half per K.Y. 
16 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Pettey? 
17 MR. PETTEY: No, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. You can step down. 
19 (Witness excused.) 
20 THE COURT: Any more witnesses, Mr. Rampton? 
21 MR. RAMPTON: No, your Honor. I'd like to recall 
22 Mr. Jay Hansen for just a moment. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Hansen if you will come back up 
24 here for a moment. You understand you are still under oath? 
25 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 J. D. HANSEN, 
3 Recalled as a witness at the instance of the Defendant, 
4 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
5 follows: 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. RAMPTON: 
8 Q Mr. Hansen, I want to show you what's been marked 
9 as Exhibit 8 and ask you if you recognize it? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q What is it? 
12 A It is a two-page document. It is an invoice from 
13 Cliff Johnson Excavating for the fill dirt that was brought 
14 into the property at 145 North Redwood Road. 
15 MR. RAMPTON: I'd ask Exhibit 8 be received in 
16 evidence. 
17 THE COURT: Any objection? 
18 MR. PETTEY: No, your Honor. 
19 MR. RAMPTON: That's all I have, your Honor. No 
20 further questions. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. Any further testimony, Mr, 
22 Pettey. 
23 MR. PETTEY: Yes I'd like to ask Mr. Hansen one 
24 additional question. 
25 THE COURT: Certainly. 
1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. PETTEY: 
3 I Q Now, when you spoke with Mr. Cliff Johnson, what 
4 instructions did you give to him with respect to the amount 
5 of fill or the proper grade or whatever that was done to 
6 that property? 
7 A Well, he was to bring the property up to grade 
8 with the adjoining properties. 
9 Q Why did you tell him that? 
10 A Because the property — the subject property was a 
11 foot and a half or so — I don't know the exact dimensions, 
12 but I would say at least a foot and a half below the 
13 adjoining property to the rear, to the south side and below 
14 both streets. And the property was a trash collector. It 
15 was part of the problem of getting the property acceptable. 
16 Q Did you tell him that because you personally 
17 wanted it brought up to that level? 
18 A No. It was my understanding the City expected the 
19 property to be cleared off and graded. 
20 MR. RAMPTON: Objection to the answer. It 
21 incorporates hearsay testimony from the City. 
22 THE COURT: Again, it can be received as a reason 
23 for doing what he did, not necessarily the truthfulness of 
24 it. Overruled. 
25 MR. PETTEY: That's all. 
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THE COURT: : Any more questions, Mr. Rampton? 
MR. RAMPTON: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
You can step down. 
(Witness excused.) 
Can I see that last exhibit? 
Well, it appears that the big majority of this 
$12,900 expenditure 
property brought up 
alone. If you add t 
is for the fill dirt to have the 
to grade, and nearly $9,700 for the dirt 
:hat to the amount that Mr. McCaughey 
says is the reasonable amount for the excavation, comes out 
about right. So the question, I guess, is whether or not, 
adding that fill is 
of the property. 
a necessary maintenance upkeep or repair 
MR. RAMPTON: May I be heard on that? There is 
City law on point. 
THE COURT : Sure. 
MR. RAMPTON: Furnishing the Court a copy of City 
Ordinance Number 18 
follows: 
MA permit 
.64.050, which reads in pertinent part as 
for demolition requires that all. 
Material comprising part of the existing. 
Instructions, 
Footings must 1 
The depression 
including the foundation and. 
oe removed from the site. 
caused by the removal of such. 
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1 Debris must be filled back and compacted to. 
2 The original grade as approved by the building. 
3 Official, with fill material" of fill dirt existing. 
4 "excluding detrimental amounts of organic material. 
5 Or large dimension non organic material." 
6 There was no requirement of filling a entire lot 
7 J with dirt in order to bring it up to the grade of 
8 I surrounding property or the surrounding roads. You simply 
9 I have to fill the hole in. That's the requirement based on 
10 statute. 
11 THE COURT: Well, you know what you have got, 
12 though, is a situation where the lady buys the property at a 
13 Sheriff's sale, and it is true it is probably not too 
14 prudent to spend any money on it until the redemption period 
15 is passed. You know, what to do with it. But the City 
16 tells her she has to demolish, whether she really reads the 
17 ordinance correctly or whether she doesn't, she puts the 
18 money into the property. And then the people come in and 
19 redeem it, and property has been improved, and they receive 
20 the benefits of the property, improvement or upkeep. Maybe 
21 not considerably a benefit. They might have wanted the 
22 house and trees and whatever, but nevertheless, what has 
23 gone into it. 
24 I really can't — you can't say that's even reasonable. 
25 That seem to me to be the question, not whether it is, you 
1 I knowr perfectly the right thing to do, but whether it was 
2 reasonable. And I think it was reasonable, and so I think I 
3 am going to rule that the redemption value here is the 
4 amount paid for the property plus six percent plus the taxes 
5 plus the 12,905 she paid for the excavation and 10 percent 
6 interest thereon. And that should be the amount that's 
7 required for the amount of redemption. 
8 Ask you to prepare an order to that effect, Mr. 
9 Pettey. 
10 MR. PETTEY: Will do, your Honor, 
11 THE COURT: Court will be in recess for about two 
12 or three minutes, then we will begin your matter, Mr. 
13 Gaither. 
14 I (Proceedings concluded.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
If NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter for 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported 
stenographically the proceedings in the matter of GUNDA M. 
GALLOWAY VS. ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR., Case No. 880901017, 
and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct 
transcript of said proceedings. 
Dated this 13th day of November, 1989. 
Notary Public ! 
NORAS.WORTHEN I 
240 East 400 So. #A-513 I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ! 
My Commission Expires I 
December 27,1992 I 
State of Utah B 
Nora S. Wor then , CSR, RPR, CP 
Utah L i c e n s e No. 205 
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Attachment 
9 
Jax H. Pettey #2594 
Attornev for Gloria Ruiz 
180 Souih 300 West #313 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 532-6721 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and 
LAURENCE GALLOWAY, 
Plaint i ffs, 
vs . 
ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.; 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, ' 
Trustee; BRIAN STEFFENSEN, ) 
Attorney at Law; LAND 
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT ) 
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI; ) 
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at ] 
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney ) 
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN <5c ) 
ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN ] 
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH ) 
TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER DE'COR, ) 
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE ] 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE ] 
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN; ) 
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, ) 
Defendants. 
i O R D 
l Civil 
1 Judge 
E R 
No. C88-1017 
Scott Daniels 
The Petition for Determination of Redemption Amount under 
Rule 69(f)3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Marcia S. 
Merrill came on for hearing on the 13th day of October, 1989, 
before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge of the above-entit1ed 
Court, Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, 
Vincent C. Rampton of Watkiss and Campbell. Respondent Gloria 
Ruiz dba CVF Land Investment Company was present and represented 
by her counsel, Jax H. Pettey. The parties stipulated to several 
items in open court and thereafter testimony was given and 
evidence presented to the Court. The Court having been fully 
advised in the premises and having made its Findings of Fact and 
Cone I us i ons of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Gloria Ruiz dba CVF Land Investment Company is hereby 
awarded all right, title and interest in and to that certain real 
property located at 145 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, subject only to statutory redemption rights. 
The legal description of said property is: 
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20 and 
21, and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY !S FOURTH 
ADDITION, according to the official plats 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22, 
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION; 
thence South 56 feet 
thence North 23 feet 
thence North 33 feet 
thence West 136 feet; 
thence Wes t 14 feet; 
thence East 150 feet to 
the point of BEGINNING. 
2. The total amount necessary for redemption of the property 
pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
determined by the Court to be $45,186.22, which is the sum of the 
following i terns: 
a. Purchase Price Paid 28,000.00. 
b. 19 88 Taxes Paid 500.20 
c. Demolition, Fill <3cGrading paid ...12,905.00 
d. Surcharge of 6% of purchase price 1,680.00 
e. Interest at the rate of 10% per annum 2,101.02 
TOTAL 45,186.2 2 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Scot t Dan i els 
D i s t i c t Cour t Judge 
